Terrorists, Siloviki and Double-SpeakBoris Kagarlitsky

Terrorists, Siloviki and Double-Speak

The number of dead and wounded in the Beslan tragedy was stunning, but so were the authorities' lies. They minimized the number of hostages and casualties. They said there were Arabs and "one black" among the terrorists. They got the names and number of terrorists mixed up, as well as the circumstances in which the hostage-taking occurred. It turned out that two of the terrorists identified in Beslan were officially listed as inmates in Russian prison camps. Supporters of rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov claimed that the security services had killed Chechens in advance and planted their corpses at the scene. Government officials were unanimous in insisting that the storming of the school was unexpected. But on Sept. 3, once the shooting had started, a statement was released to the press outlining the careful preparations made for the operation.

"Agents in Emergency Situations Ministry uniforms, who had come to collect the bodies of the dead, first approached the school to within handgun range," the statement read. "In the firefight that ensued, they would take the full brunt of the terrorists' fire. Then special forces used a directional explosion to blow up one wall of the school, and hostages began to flee from the building. Snipers quickly opened fire on the fighters as they spilled out of the school, trying first to catch the running children and then simply shooting at them. Special forces immediately burst into the school from all four sides. ... The entire operation lasted 12 minutes, twice as long as prescribed in anti-terrorism manuals. But for the first time the freed hostages were little children. ... As in any complex hostage rescue operation, there are civilian casualties as well. Some of the terrorists escaped from the school, but this was a planned measure intended to put as much distance between the terrorists and the children as possible. These savages will be rounded up in the next two or three days. They will not leave the republic."

Those involved in the events told a different story. It's true that operational headquarters in Beslan didn't plan to storm the school. Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev contacted Akhmed Zakayev in London in an attempt to secure the intervention of rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov. Maskhadov promised to come to the school and secure the release of the hostages, but he demanded safe passage. While officials on the scene debated the possibility of cooperating with Maskhadov, their superiors in Moscow reached their own decision.

The Kremlin could not allow Zakayev and Maskhadov to act as mediators. Even if no political concessions were made, their involvement would be a propaganda coup for the separatists. Openly planning to storm the building was also impossible, as the authorities would have had to take responsibility for any casualties. Everything possible was done to prevent carnage. Local vigilantes stood in the front row around the school to prevent special forces from storming the building.

Storming the school was both politically inevitable and impermissible. It had to happen -- as if by accident. It has now been established that shots were fired from behind the line of local vigilantes before the bomb went off in the school. Eyewitnesses recall that the shots were extremely accurate; one of the fighters was killed on the spot. Aushev has complained about a "third force." It's not hard to guess who was in command of this "third force."

As a result, the vigilantes themselves rushed in first to save the hostages who were fleeing the building. This left Federal Security Service special forces units with no option but to enter the fray. In the aftermath of Beslan, these units were roundly criticized for not having done enough to save the hostages, and for lack of professionalism. They paid with their lives and their reputation for political decisions made far from the scene.

Political hysteria spread through the country. We were urged to rally around the regime. Unfortunately, our chances for survival depend little on measures adopted by the state. In my estimation, the U.S. security system has only gotten worse since 9/11. Increased security checks have led to a decrease in overall effectiveness. Yet no more terrorist attacks have occurred. In Israel, on the other hand, people are dying despite a very effective security system. Perhaps the real issue isn't the system but the aims of those who sponsor terror?

When Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq, many observers in Russia said the Spanish had capitulated. After all, everyone has known since the 1970s that making concessions to terrorists only leads to further attacks and more outlandish demands. Back then, this rule might have held true. Terrorism back then was practiced only by a few fanatical organizations. Today terrorism is an organized industry interwoven with the security services.

Spain's decision was supposed to provoke a wave of murders and bombings across Europe, especially in countries whose troops were involved in the occupation of Iraq. But the opposite happened; Europe calmed down.

Does this mean that the standard policy of not cutting deals with terrorists is wrong? No. As the well-known journalist Anatoly Baranov has noted, terrorists attack not in order to end wars, but to start them. Peaceful conflict resolution is not a concession to terror but the only effective method for confronting it.

The bombings in Spain coincided with the rise of the antiwar movement. The Socialists, who promised to bring the troops home from Iraq, enjoyed increased popularity. After the bombings, the nation was supposed to realize the importance of the war against terrorism, to rally around the government and support the occupation. Instead, antiwar sentiment grew, the Socialists won the election and Spain pulled its troops out of Iraq. In response, the bombers sharply curtailed their activities.

Terrorists' demands must be distinguished from their political goals. Their demands are usually just a bluff. Those who sponsor and organize terrorist attacks know that the authorities will not meet their demands, and often their real goals are completely different. Terror is part of the battle for power -- often in places far from the blast site.

Back on July 29, before the Beslan tragedy, I wrote in this space that divisions in the security services, which had become obvious by mid-summer, would lead to a wave of terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, that column proved prophetic. The battle for power is turning us all -- President Vladimir Putin included -- into hostages. Putin has no cards left to play. The siloviki, oligarchs, corrupt bureaucrats and officers in the security services who brought him to power with the help of bombings, terrorist attacks and war have now split into various factions. The feud between the chekists and the military, the sacking of former General Staff chief Anatoly Kvashnin, and ham-fisted attempts to establish FSB control over the military have led at best to strikes in the security services. And at worst.

Have you ever wondered why responsibility for destroying the passenger jet that fell not far from Putin's summer residence was claimed by a previously unknown organization, the "Islambouli Brigades"? The group's name speaks for itself: Khaled Islambouli was an Egyptian army officer who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Perhaps the attack on the jet was a hint. And for those who didn't get the hint, it was repeated. The group also claimed responsibility for downing a second plane and for the Rizhskaya metro bombing. The "Islambouli Brigades" were threatening to go after Putin.

"War has been declared against us," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced. Lapdog journalists adjusted his statement to read, "War has been declared against Russia." But what has Russia got to do with any of this? We're hostages. If you want your message to be taken seriously, blow up a plane.

In fact, Ivanov committed a very Freudian slip of the tongue. What we are observing is the dismantling of Putin's power by the same methods with which it was built. They say if you live by the sword you will die by the sword -- especially if the sword isn't yours.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/09/23/006.html

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